In this paper we develop a simple endogenous growth model with two competing production technologies and learning spillover effects between firms that use the same technology. Investments are directed to the technology with highest current and expected returns. Since current investments increase future returns through learning, the economy will usually lock in, that is specialise in one of the two technologies. In case the economy has selected a relative polluting technology, sustainable growth requires a transition towards the clean technology. We analyse the scope for (environmental) policies that induce such a transition.
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will specialise in technologies typical for that cluster, instead of following a uniform growth path over all technologies within different clusters. This phenomenon of specialisation in a cluster is known as a lock-in.
For many environmental problems, the solution may require a technological transition away from a technological regime that is emission intensive or heavily rests upon the exploitation of specific natural resources, towards technological regimes that are less emission intensive or less dependent on resource exploitation. In this paper, we study policies that can unlock the economy from an emission or resource intensive technology cluster, and that set in motion a transition towards a cluster of environmentally more friendly technologies.
We develop an endogenous growth model based on the Romer (1986) AK model in which investments in the capital stock increase labor productivity. We extend the basic one-sector model, and describe two competing sectors, representing clusters of technologies that have strong internal spillover effects. The problem of lock-in is described as the existence of, and the ambiguity in the selection out of, multiple locally stable equilibria. A technological transition corresponds to the selection of a locally stable equilibrium different from the present one. This paper studies the mechanisms of, and policy initiatives necessary to set in motion, such a transition. 4, 5 In the literature, there are two opposing streams considering history and expectations, respectively, as the factors that determine the selection of one specific equilibrium, out of a set of multiple locally stable equilibria (see Krugman, 1991) . The first stream, which believes that the historical path of development is essential, is represented both in the mainstream economic literature (e.g. Ethier, 1982 , Krugman, 1981 , 1987 and in the evolutionary economics literature (Arthur, 1986) . The second stream holds the view that the expected economic development is the key determinant of choice of equilibrium (e.g. Chen and Shimomura 1998) . In this view, selffulfilling prophecies play an important role, and accordingly, a major responsibility of the public 4 Tahvonen and Salo (2001) also describe an endogenous growth economy with a transition from non-fossil-fuel energy technologies to fossil-fuel energy technologies, and backwards. Different from our analysis, in their paper, the transition is set in motion by the different characteristics of both energy technologies, that is the increasing costs of the non-fossil-fuel technology, and the depletion of fossil fuels, respectively. In Tahvonen and Salo there is no ambiguity in the selection of the inter-temporal equilibrium. 5 The recent literature also suggests that niche markets can be essential for the locking out of an economy, securing a minimal market size for infant technologies (Cowan and Hulten, 1996, Islas, 1997) . In this paper, we abstract from this phenomenon.
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4 agency is to create convergent expectations as to the future direction of economic development. In our model, both history and expectations play a role.
As regards the interplay between present policies, history, and expectations, our paper fits in a broader literature on environmental policies and the selection of socially preferred equilibrium allocations out of a multiple set of possible equilibria. Recent papers such as Mäler (2000) and Kremer and Marcom (2000) study policies that would bring back an economic and environmental system locked in an inferior steady state to an environmentally superior steady state. Similar to these two papers, in our paper, we study the scope for government intervention that aims at the selection of an environmentally preferred dynamic equilibrium. In another way, abstracting from the environmental concerns, our analysis is also related to the endogenous growth literature that studies multiple balanced growth paths. Recent examples of endogenous growth models that contain multiple equilibria include Chen and Shimomura (1998) and Zhang (1998) . In Chen and Shimomura (1998) , only self-fulfilling expectations matter in selecting the equilibrium. There is no path dependency. Zhang (1998) asks for public intervention to ensure the economy selects the preferred equilibrium. In his model, like in ours, history and expectations play an important role.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the set-up of our basic model, without an environmental externality, will be discussed. In section 3, we will analyse equilibrium path solutions of this basic model. In section 4, we study the consequences of an environmental constraint for economic growth and analyse the scope for environmental policies. Section 5 concludes.
Model set up
We consider a so-called AK model with endogenous growth in the tradition of the Romer (1986) model. 6 Our model adds to the literature as we consider two sectors for production of the single man-made good, instead of one, studying the effects of the non-convexity in the production set on optimal investments, the selection of one sector for specialisation, and the possibility for a transition when environmental constraints lock the economy in an inferior steady state.
An infinitely-lived consumer maximizes intertemporal welfare, as given by 6 A good reading of the model can be found in Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, Ch. 4] REYER GERLAGH AND MARJAN HOFKES
where C t is the consumption of a single consumer good in period t. We assume that the utility function U(.) has constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution γ>0, so that the interest rate r evolves according to
where the hat denotes the relative growth rate, i.e. $ & / C C C = .
The production side of the economy is described by two sectors. Each sector, i=1,2, represents a different cluster of technologies that is available for the production of the consumer good. Both technologies are characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production function:
where η i is a constant overall productivity coefficient, K i is the capital stock, H i is the human knowledge productivity factor, and L i denotes the employed labor force. The capital stock depreciates with rate δ, while gross investments I i are added to the stock:
Capital has a spill over to labor productivity. Part of this spillover, ζ, is sector-specific, and the remainder is non-sector-specific:
for 0<ζ<1, where we use subscript "-i" when referring to the other sector. If in both sectors the capital stock increases by factor 2, then in both sectors labor productivity increases by the same factor (5), and in both sectors output increases by factor 2 (3). Thus, the overall production frontier of the economy has constant returns to scale in the capital stock as in the Romer (1986) growth model, thereby permitting a sustained growth path.
Consumption plus investments are constrained by gross production:
Finally, labor supply, L , which is assumed to be constant and inelastic, matches labor demand:
Without loss of generality, we assume that labor units are chosen such that L =1. We can thus describe the labor allocation by the variable l 1 =L 1 , which denotes the share of labor used in the first sector.
Optimal paths
The Hamiltonian for the welfare maximization program reads:
where we normalised prices for the consumer good, that is, we have a shadow price equal to unity for the commodity balance (6). The first order conditions are not altered by the normalisation, except for the shadow price dynamics ψ i associated with the state variables. The dynamics for the shadow prices ψ for the stock K are now given by 
H
) set the prices for both output goods equal to unity:
Labor is allocated so as to maximize its productivity, and its distribution over both sectors immediately adjusts to the current capital and human knowledge stock distribution. Labor productivity (the wage) is denoted by w. Now, for both sectors the wage should equal marginal labor productivity in the specific sector, w i , given by:
7 for i=1,2, and along an optimal path, we have w=w 1 =w 2 . For given capital stock K i and human knowledge H i , the labor market equilibrium is found by setting w 1 = w 2 , which gives:
The equation shows that a higher capital stock K i , which in turn implies a higher human knowledge productivity factor H i , increases the labor share l i employed in sector i (keeping the capital stock in the other sector constant). We notice that the labor allocation is homogeneous of degree zero in K, since H i is also linearly homogeneous in the vector K. That is, l 1 only depends on the relative shares of capital in both sectors. For convenience, we define the level of the capital stock in first sector as a share of the total capital stock,
Now, (11) can be written in reduced form as
for continuous F(.):(0,1)→(0,1). Notice that F(0;.)=0 and F(1;.)=1; if all capital is allocated to the first sector, then all labor is allocated to the first sector as well, and if all capital is allocated to the second sector, then labor is allocated thereto as well.
After investments, there is no capital mobility between the two sectors. Capital formation follows from past and present investment decisions. First order conditions for investments I i give the equality ψ i +µ i =1, which says that the capital stock prices ψ i equals unity unless investments are zero: ψ i ≤1 with equality if I i >0. Using the complementarity sign, ⊥, we write:
for i = 1,2. In less technical terms, the inequality states that investments take place only when the aggregated and discounted future returns on capital, reflected in the price of capital, ψ i , 
The value of the immediate capital returns q i is given by:
After substitution of
which follows from the first order condition for the labor productivity stock H i , we arrive at
On the right hand side, we find the direct contribution of capital to production as in (3), the indirect contribution through the increase in human knowledge in the own sector, H i , as represented in (5), and the indirect contribution through the increase in human knowledge in the other sector H -i . Similar to the labor allocation l 1 , the returns on capital q i are homogeneous of degree zero in the total capital stock; q i is a function of the relative capital stock, which we can write in reduced form as
for continuous G i (.):(0,1)→(0,∞). For the capital stock share converging to zero, k 1 →0, we have:
And for k 1 →1, we have:
A graphical representation of the possible capital returns q 1 and q 2 as a function of k 1 is given in To ensure that a sustained growth path is feasible and optimal, we assume that for all possible initial values of k 1 , one of the two sectors has capital returns exceeding the capital depreciation rate δ plus the pure time preference ρ:
Under this assumption, there is always one sector for which capital returns can support sustained economic growth, and investments are always positive in at least one sector.
Investments will take place in the sector with the highest present and future returns, captured in the capital price ψ i (15). The full dynamic analysis of investments is somewhat complicated, and as a starting point, we assume that the initial state of the economy is such that, at t=0, capital returns in the first sector are equal to capital returns in the second sector, q 1 (0)= q 2 (0), for the optimal labor share l 1 given by (11). That is, the economy starts at point A in Figure 1 .
Furthermore, we assume that the economy selects the first sector to invest in, I 1 >0, I 2 =0, and we ask ourselves whether this selection is consistent with an optimal path. Capital in both sectors depreciates, but only in the first sector the depreciation is counterbalanced by investments, so that the capital stock and the human productivity factor of the first sector increase relative to the levels in the second sector, and consequently, the capital productivity in the first sector relative to the capital productivity in the second sector increases as well, ∂ ∂ / ( / ) t1 2 0 > . Once the economy selects the first sector for investments, the returns to capital in the first sector increase relative to the returns to capital in the second sector, and the selection becomes self-enforcing. Investments in the second sector remain zero, and the economy fully specializes. A lock-in occurs. Figure 1 shows the selection of the first sector; the initial situation for t=0 is represented by point A, the ESCAPING LOCK IN 10 arrows towards C show the increase in the relative capital stock k 1 as the economy specialises.
The economy converges to a steady state C with k 1 =1, l 1 =1, r = η 1 -δ, g = (η 1 -δ)/γ, ψ 1 =1, and ψ 2 <1, where g is the common growth rate for output, investments, and consumption.
In short, if q 1 (0)= q 2 (0), then the choice to invest only in the first sector is consistent with the first order optimality conditions. Obviously, if the economy were initially, at period t=0, in another state to the right of A in Figure 1 , with q 1 (0) > q 2 (0), the same investments decisions could be rationalised and the economy would still converge to a full specialisation in the first sector.
However, though this may not be obvious, even if initial capital returns in the first sector are below capital returns in the first sector, q 1 (0) < q 2 (0), a path can exist that satisfies the first order conditions for optimality and in which the economy selects the first sector for specialisation. More precisely, there is an interval of initial states k 1 ∈(B 1 ,B 2 ) such that for any initial state within this interval, there exists both a path with full specialization in the first and a path with full specialization in the second sector, both paths being consistent with the first order optimality conditions. Krugman (1991) refers to this interval as the 'overlap'.
7 This finding, of two different paths that select different steady states to which they converge, is a well-known phenomenon in the literature. An early analysis is by Skiba (1978) , who analysed optimal investments under a convex-concave production function and who proved the existence of two stable steady states and one unstable steady state in-between. In our economy, we have a similar situation, as A represents an unstable steady state (balanced growth path), while C 1 and C 2 represent two stable steady states (balanced growth paths). The unstable balanced growth path A is straightforwardly constructed by taking the relative capital stocks for which q=q 1 (0)=q 2 (0), and choosing investments as
The resulting path has growth rate g=(q-ρ-δ)/γ>0 (23 welfare point of view, there is a level S for the relative capital stock k 1 to the right of which it is optimal to specialize in the first sector, and to the left of which it is optimal to specialize in the second sector. In the recent growth literature, Benhabib and Perli (1994) , Shimomura (1998), and Ladrón-de-Guevara et al. (1999) discuss similar dynamic patterns in relation to the existence of multiple equilibrium paths.
Yet, in our economy, the precise analysis of dynamics is somewhat more complex as suggested above, since we have two state variables K 1 and K 2 , and two associated co-state variables ψ 1 and ψ 2 . To study in more detail the selection mechanisms in our economy, we will construct a phase diagram in state-co-state space. A complete phase diagram for (K 1 ,K 2 ,ψ 1 ,ψ 2 ) would require an analysis in four dimensions. Fortunately, the analysis of the four-dimensional state-co-state space (K 1 ,K 2 ,ψ 1 ,ψ 2 ) can be reduced to the two-dimensional state-co-state space (k 1 ,φ), since, as we have seen above, the labor allocation and capital returns only depend on the relative capital share k 1 , and either one of the two capital prices ψ 1 and ψ 2 has value unity, so that
defines a one-to-one mapping of the feasible equilibrium values for (
The following figure pictures the mapping. The value φ=0 stands for the situation in which ψ 1 =0 and ψ 2 =1, only capital for the second sector has a positive value. If 0<φ<1/2, then 0<ψ 1 <1 and ψ 2 =1; the capital stock in the first sector has a positive value, but its value is so low that no investments take place, I 1 =0 (14). The value φ=1/2 stands for the situation in which ψ 1 =ψ 2 =1. It is possible that both sectors have positive investments levels I 1 >0 and I 2 >0. If 1/2<φ<1, then ψ 1 =1 and 0<ψ 2 <1; the capital stock in the second sector has a positive value, but its value is so low that no investments take place, I 2 =0 (14).
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Finally, φ=1 stands for the situation in which ψ 1 =1 and ψ 2 =0, only capital for the first sector has a positive value. Now, we are in the position to study the dynamics in (k 1 ,φ) space (Figure 3) . We follow the common procedure; we first consider the dynamics of k 1 , and then we consider the dynamics of φ in (k 1 ,φ)-space.
k =K K +K For 0≤φ<1/2, we have 0≤ψ 1 <1 and ψ 2 =1, and in turn I 1 =0 and I 2 >0 (14). Since both capital stocks have the same depreciation rate δ, investments in the second sector ensure that the share of the second capital stock in the total capital stock will increase, 0 1 < k & . In analogy, for 1/2<φ≤1, we have ψ 1 =1 and 0≤ψ 2 <1, and in turn I 1 >0 and I 2 =0 (14), and the share of the first capital stock in the total capital stock will increase, 1 k & >0. Thus, below the line φ=1/2, or ψ 1 = ψ 2 = 1, paths are directed to the left, and above the line, paths are directed to the right:
The direction of movement for φ is determined by the relative returns on capital q i when comparing both sectors (16 
REYER GERLAGH AND MARJAN HOFKES 13 which, in turn, gives
where we can rewrite the right-hand-side in terms of φ as follows: φ = (q 1 /2q 2 ). Equivalently, we
or in terms of φ: φ=1-(q 2 /2q 1 ). Now, on the basis of the capital returns drawn in Figure 1 To conclude this section, we comment on the policies required to ensure the decentralised economy selects an optimal path. If, within each sector, the firms are small, they will neglect the spillover effects of their investments on the productivity in other firms, and investments in the 8 We also notice that the phase diagram does not rule out spiral paths around the unstable steady state A. However, these paths are not relevant, since a cycling between the two sectors will cause welfare losses as it does not fully profit from the increasing returns to scale. The optimal path must select immediately one sector for specialisation.
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14 competitive equilibrium will fall short of the social optimum. It is therefore necessary for the social planner to have instruments available such as subsidies that internalise the investment spillovers. Similar to the one-sector AK-model, in our economy, the social planner needs to ensure that the level of investments match their social optimum. In the model with two sectors, however, the social planner also needs to guide the economy with respect to the distribution of investments over both sectors, that is the social planner has to determine the direction of economic growth and it has to ensure that the individual firms select the proper sector (technology) to invest in.
For all initial states between B 1 and B 2 , there are two paths that satisfy the first order optimality conditions, one converging to C 1 , and the other converging to C 2 , respectively. For given initial state, the market is indeterminate as to the direction of economic growth. Yet the Skiba point S marks a unique state to the left of which it is optimal to select the second sector, and to the right of which it is optimal to select the first sector for specialisation. The social planner has to ensure that the economy selects the proper path for its development (Bold in Figure 3 ). As Krugman (1991) has pointed out, when an ambiguity persists for the path the economy will follow, the planner should create convergent expectations around aggregate investments in specific technologies. The social planner has to communicate that she will support the preferred investment path, and that, if necessary, she will take measures to lock out the other possible future investment path (similar to the policy in Kremer and Marcom 2000) . Now we are ready to continue with the second step of our analysis, i.e. to introduce, next to the investment externality and the 'choice of technology' externality, a third, environmental, externality in our model.
Environmental constraints and a transition policy
Environmental concerns may arise if the economy has specialized in a sector (technology) that turns out to be polluting or relative resource intensive. We can think of the fossil fuel technologies that are associated with greenhouse gas emissions. So-called backstop technologies with zero emissions may provide an alternative for the energy supply, but these alternative technologies have lower immediate capital returns and will need substantial initial investments to become competitive. While a technology transition may be beneficial from an environmental point of view, in an economic sense, the past selection of the fossil-fuel technologies can be irreversible; the economy is locked in.
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In our model, let us assume that the economy has specialized in the first sector and has reached the balanced growth path C 1 . Growth has continued for some time, but at some time, detrimental effects of resource use, necessary for the production in the first sector, become significant. We can think of resources becoming scarce, manifested through increasing resource extraction costs, or, alternatively, we can think of resource use causing pollution that decreases the amenity values of the environment. Furthermore, let us assume that the second sector provides an alternative for a 'green' growth path, in the sense that resource use will pose no significant limit to its expansion.
Thus, if the economy succeeds in making a successful transition, the economy could continue on an undisturbed sustained growth path.
In the formal terms of our economy, let us assume that resource use is strictly linked to output of sector 1, R=Y 1 , 9 and in turn, that per period resource use adds negatively to the utility function, so that (1) becomes:
where, for convenience, we assumed that the resource externality can linearly be expressed in consumer good units.
While the economy grows and maintains its selection of the first sector, the environmental externality will receive a (Pigouvian) shadow price, internalised through a tax τ levied on the output of the first sector. In the Hamiltonian (8), we replace utility χU(C) by χU(C-νR), and we add the term τ(Y 1 -R), so that we have 
In fact we assume that the production function in sector 1 has a Leontief specification with respect to resource use.
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It follows immediately from the first order conditions for R and C that τ=νχU'(.)=ν. Taking the first order conditions for Y 1 , we find that the net output price for goods produced in the first sector is reduced by factor (1-τ). In turn, labor productivity and capital returns in the first sector decrease and net capital investments decrease.
The question addressed in this section is: which policy is required to set in motion the transition towards the 'clean' sector (technology). We take as a starting point the situation where the environmental externality is fully internalised; the environment has received its price.
We can distinguish three possibilities. First, immediate capital returns in the second sector exceed immediate capital returns in the first sector and a transition begins without the need for any further policy (Figure 4 ). Second, it is possible that the immediate capital returns in the first sector decrease, but still exceed the capital returns in the second sector. Nonetheless, a transition becomes attainable ( Figure 5 ), but it needs additional policy measures to be set in motion. The third possibility is that, though the capital productivity in the second sector improves relative to the capital productivity in the first sector, this does not warrant a transition. We now elaborate on the first two cases.
Given output taxes τ for the first sector, returns to labor decrease by factor (1-τ) and the labor distribution (11) changes into:
Similarly, the capital returns for the capital stock in the first sector q 1 decrease by factor (1-τ) inasmuch as the direct and indirect contribution to the output of the first sector is concerned (19):
We notice that since the Pigouvian tax decreases capital returns in the first sector, which is dominant, it also decreases the growth rate of the economy. In reduced form, we may write
where, we added tax parameters for both sectors to the function G(.). Under full specialization, k 1 =1, the capital returns become
While the output tax for the first sector decreases the returns on labor and capital within this sector, it relatively raises the returns on labor and capital in the second sector. When the Pigouvian tax increases from zero to a positive value, the unstable steady state A in Figure 1 for which q 1 =q 2 , the Skiba point S, and the transition points B 1 and B 2 shift to the right. If taxes are such that the immediate capital returns in the first sector drop below the immediate returns in the second sector, q 1 <q 2 , it becomes optimal for every single firm to shift investments to the second sector, and the transition takes off. (Figure 4 ). In this case, it suffices for the social planner to give the environment its price, since the Pigouvian tax ensures that the optimal path, which defines a transition, is the only path consistent with first the order conditions. 
Figure 4. Capital returns lowered by a resource tax τ; induced transition
In the second case, the Pigouvian tax is insufficient to raise the returns to capital in the second sector above the returns in the first sector ( Figure 5 ), given the historic full specialization in the first sector. Yet, a transition towards the second sector may be optimal when taking into account future capital returns. Under these circumstances, the social planner has to lock out the economy and to guide it to ensure that it selects the second sector for investments, as for the individual firm, continued investments in the first sector is still a consistent strategy. The transition is also consistent with the first order conditions, but its initiation requires that the individual agents believe it will take place. Public intervention is required to initiate the transition, for example by eliminating the current balanced growth path, as in Kremer and Marcom (2000) . An effective policy would be if the planner announces a future environmental levy above the Pigouvian level
in case the transition does not take place. The announcement will force all individual firms to move their investments to the second sector, forming a coherent strategy. Notably, the threat of increased environmental levies need not be implemented, as the mere announcement suffices to enforce the transition to be set in motion. Finally, it should be noted that in this case a pure environmental policy, which fully internalises the environmental externality, does not suffice to reach the welfare optimum. In fact we are back in the basic model where next to an internalization of the investment externality the government has to guide the economy to select the optimal technology. For small environmental externalities, we end up in the third case, in which the resource externality is insufficient to justify a transition towards the alternative technology. The net present value of the transition costs exceeds the net present value of environmental damages, and there is no need for the government to guide the economy starting a transition. Still the intervention of the government is needed to internalize he capital spill-overs as well as the environmental externalities as such.
Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed a model that combines elements of endogenous growth theory with the concept of lock-in that has its roots in the evolutionary economics literature. We described an endogenous growth model with two sectors (technologies) that both have strong internal spillovers. In this economy, there exist multiple growth paths satisfying the first order conditions. More specifically, the economy can choose to specialize in either one of the two REYER GERLAGH AND MARJAN HOFKES 19 sectors. Current investments determine the relative growth of both sectors, and thereby the selection of the growth path, and in turn, current investments are determined by the immediate and expected capital returns in both sectors. Since future capital returns are positively related to present investments, there is a positive feedback, and the selection of one or another sector (technology) for investments is ambiguous, but once the selection is made, it is self-enhancing.
Both history and expectations play a role in the selection of equilibrium. In case immediate capital productivity does not differ too much between the two sectors, the economy can specialize in either of the sectors. It is well possible that the economy specializes in the sector that has the lowest immediate capital returns. To ensure the selection of the socially optimal path, the social planner has to create coherent expectations about the direction of economic growth, as already pointed out by Krugman (1991) .
If the economy has specialized in a sector heavily resting on resource use, or causing environmental pollution, this may constrain future growth in case of a limited resource supply or a limited pollution absorption capacity. If immediate capital returns do not differ too much between the 'clean' and 'dirty' sector, the announcement of environmental policies supporting a transition to the 'clean' sector suffices to set in motion the transition, without the need for actual environmental regulations to take place. In case of a substantial advantage of the 'dirty' sector, in terms of immediate capital returns, a transition may need the support of environmental levies or subsidies. In all cases there is a role for the government as to ensure the internalization of the investment spill-overs as well as of the environmental externalities.
The implication of our analysis for environmental policy is twofold. First, it makes clear that the impact of environmental levies and subsidies on economic production is not restricted to marginal changes in production inputs and outputs. Environmental regulations may bring about the development of specific technologies that cause a substantial shift in the production inputoutput matrix. Second, the analysis stresses the importance of a clear and reliable policy regarding the future direction of economic growth. 
